were instituted to protect the college athlete, while state and model legislation had largely ignored the professional athlete. 32 The agent was required to comply with the requirements of each state in which he conducted business and the requirements varied widely from state-to-state. 33 In 1997 in an 25 Lipscomb & Titlebaum, supra note 2, at 100 (noting that the agent must understand the athlete's objectives and what the athlete is willing to concede). 26 Id. A CBA is an agreement which is reached through the negotiation of an employer or an employer's organization and a representative workers' organization. Sriyan de Silva, Collective Bargaining Negotiations (July 13, 1998), at http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:NtfkDUFsvFUJ:www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actemp/papers/1998/srscbarg .htm+collective+bargaining+agreement+defined+explained&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=2. 27 Lipscomb & Titlebaum, supra note 2, at 100. 28 Id. 29 Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") began to draft a model law to provide for uniformity in the regulation of sports agents. 34 The NCCUSL completed its work on the Uniform Athlete Agents Act ("UAAA") in 2000 and as of March 14, 2006 the UAAA had been passed in the District of Columbia, the United States Virgin Islands and thirty-four states. 35 The UAAA keeps many of the basic provisions previously required by many states but also provides for reciprocity between states with a streamlined registration process for agents who have registered in another state within the past six months.
36
Although the Act provides for some general registration requirements the focus of the Act is on the recruitment and solicitation efforts of agents in regard to student athletes. 37 In essence, the Act only regulates dealings between the agent and the student athlete and fails to address the dealings of the sports agent and the professional athlete, thereby failing to protect the professional athlete. 38 The only federal regulation pertaining to sports agents is the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act ("SPARTA") which was passed into law on September 24, 2004. 39 This law prohibits the agent from giving the student athlete anything of value before the student signs the contract, requires notification of the student's college athletic director before a contract is signed and prohibits 
IV. Regulation of Sports Agents by Players Associations
In 1983 the NFLPA was the first professional sports players association to regulate sports agents. 42 All of these associations now require that the agent become certified by the association before the agent can negotiate a contract for an athlete in that association. 43 Most but not all of the associations have provisions regulating agent's fees, limits on duration of the agent's contract with the athlete and provisions for early termination of the contract by either party. 44 The NFLPA's regulations state that the agent is prohibited from "engaging in unlawful conduct and/or conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or other activity which reflects adversely on his/her fitness as a Contract Advisor or jeopardizes his/her effective representation of National Football League ("NFL") players." 45 Additionally, the regulations prohibit the agent from engaging in activity which "creates an actual or potential conflict of interest with the effective representation of NFL players." 46 The NFLPA does not prohibit an agent from representing more than one athlete on a team or from representing athletes and coaches or management simultaneously. 47 regulatory language is weak, and may be overly vague, for the purpose of adequately defining violations and allowing for investigation and enforcement. 51 An official for the NFLPA has asserted that the association has the resources but often lacks sufficient evidence to address the complaints.
52

V. Agents and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The agent is bound by the laws that govern attorneys despite the fact that they might attempt The actions taken in the course of the agent's business will likely fall within the scope of the state bar's ethics rules as long as he represents himself to some as an attorney. 64 Arguably, the scope of activities of the agent is within the practice of an attorney and the client's best interest is served by continuing the obligation of the profession. 65 Some athletes may be drawn to an agent because the agent is an attorney and the athlete may feel an attorney can provide expertise that the nonattorney agent cannot provide. Attorney agents are likely to be held to a significantly higher 59 Barner, supra note 31, at 522. 60 In re Dwight, 573 P.2d 481, 484 (Ariz. 1977) (noting that Dwight was disbarred for failing to maintain proper accounting records, commingled his funds with the plaintiff's funds, and taking money from the plaintiff for his own personal use). The defendant failed to prove his contention that he was not bound by the ethics rules because he was engaged in some type of professional activity other than law. In this setting the agent may use the market value as a gauge to push a team to its highest level or beyond in the process of negotiating a particular salary for the athlete.
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Hence, if the overall market dictated the value of an athlete there would be no role for the skillful agent. Most professional athletes do have agents and in the negotiation process the agent is the advocate for his athlete. A more talented agent may be able to negotiate a larger salary for an athlete than a less talented agent negotiating for that same athlete. At the outset of the negotiation there may be a salary range that a team is contemplating paying an athlete or they have likely established a reservation price. The reservation price is not necessarily static and the agent's role is to show the team the value of the athlete or how the team has undervalued the athlete. 113 The agent wants to obtain a salary at the upper end of the range or provide the team with a reason to exceed the reservation price. The prepared agent will also have studied the rules regarding the league's salary cap. The NBA generally has what is considered as a "soft" cap which limits the amount of money the team may spend each year on athletes' salaries, but teams are allowed to exceed the cap in numerous situations. 114 The "soft" cap allows for the agent to utilize integrative bargaining techniques during the negotiation. Conversely, the NFL is widely regarded to have a "hard" salary cap. 115 There are ways to circumvent the cap but the loopholes and the exceptions are rare. 116 The agent representing an athlete playing for the NFL will more likely be limited to distributive negotiations although the loopholes in the NFL salary cap rules may allow the shrewd agent to negotiate a deal in such a way that it is not purely a zero-sum interaction.
117
It has also been said that barring an agent from representing more than one athlete on a team would lead to excessively far-reaching results. 118 The argument is that this would limit the athlete's access to experienced agents. 119 The more numerous. 142 Many athletes are sheltered because of their status and they are accustomed to letting others take care of many aspects of their lives so that they can focus on excelling at their sport. 143 The athlete may be very trusting of the agent and overly dependent on the agent who acts in a nearly parental role. 144 Even if the athlete is aware of the conflict, the agent remains compromised and therefore risks continue regarding the athlete's interests. Additionally, even if a conflict can be cured the terms of a contract for one client may be confidential and disclosure of the information to another client thus becomes a breach of confidentiality.
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The NFLPA prohibits the agent from engaging in activity which "creates an actual or potential conflict of interest with the effective representation of NFL players," but the regulations do not specifically prohibit agents from representing multiple athletes on a team. 146 Unlike the MRPC the NFLPA regulations do not state that the agent can cure a conflict with express informed consent. 147 The NFLPA regulations therefore are inconsistent in that they prohibit conflicts outright, yet in practice allow conflicts such as the agent representation of multiple athletes on the same team. 148 The agent meanwhile continues to be bound by the state bar ethical rules regardless of the inconsistencies of the NFLPA regulations.
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C. Agent Representation of Athletes and Coaches or Management
A conflict of interest can also arise when an agent represents both athletes and coaches or individuals in team management from the same league. 150 The conflict is even more pronounced
E. The Percentage Fee: Ethical Considerations
The MRPC provides that "a lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an 173 Nahrwold, supra note 8, at 449. Three methods used for calculating agents' fees are the percentage fee, the hourly fee and the flat fee. The percentage fee is the most commonly used method. In some instances in addition to the athlete's base salary the percentage may also include the bonuses and incentives given to the athlete. Using the hourly fee arrangement the agent charges for time spent working for the athlete and under the flat fee arrangement the agent is paid a predetermined fee regardless of the amount of time spent negotiating the contract. Lipscomb & Titlebaum, supra note 2, at 102. 174 Nahrwold, supra note 8, at 449 (noting that the players associations' regulation of agents' fees applies only to contracts negotiated by the agent between the team and the athlete). The players associations do not limit the fees an agent may collect to negotiate a deal outside of the athlete's contract with the team. Sudia & Remis, supra note 44, at 804. 175 Nahrwold, supra note 8, at 449. 176 Barner, supra note 31, at 524. 177 Id. at 524-25.
David Falk, the agent for NBA player Shawn Bradley, states he spent less than ten hours negotiating a contract for Bradley with the Philadelphia 76ers. 178 Falk's fee for the negotiation was $1.8 million which translate to an hourly rate of approximately $180,000. 179 An able attorney in a large, respected Houston law firm may charge $500 per hour; consequently charging the athlete an hourly rate versus a percentage of the contract would result in a fee of $5000 instead of $1.8 million.
It must be observed that the negotiation of a multimillion dollar contract for an athlete is no different from the negotiation of a multimillion dollar contract for a client in any other business. Whether the transaction is in the sports industry or another industry the attorney must be knowledgeable regarding the regulations in that particular industry. A fee based on a percentage of the contract may be unreasonable and thus unethical despite the practice being common in the sports industry. NBA attorney agent Lon Babby seems to agree. 180 Rather than charging a percentage of the contract value, Babby charges clients an hourly rate while working for the law firm of William and
Connolly. 181 Babby notes that "agents don't like us" but states that he is saving the athlete "a lot of money" while surrounding the athlete with people who are "making the best business decisions for the athletes."
182
VII. Solutions
It is clear that many conflicts can exist in the setting of negotiations involving agents and professional athletes. 183 It is debatable whether these conflicts are amenable to a cure, but if they are allowed to persist, the risk of harm to the athlete can be substantial. 184 Recently, complaints by NFL players against agents have increased. 185 There may be additional conflicts leading to harm which are unreported because the athlete is unaware of the abuse or unwilling to report it. 186 Some athletes may forego the complaint process and simply switch agents. 187 The players associations are in the best position to protect the athletes and should adopt stringent uniform regulations for agents.
Players associations' regulations should preclude the practice of agents representing more than one athlete per team, and the practice of simultaneous representation of athletes and coaches/management. The agent should be required to provide a list to the players association of all athletes represented by that agent. 188 There are additional areas of conflict which are common in the industry. 189 For example, an agent representing a certain athlete may sponsor an event at which that athlete appears. 190 A conflict will arise when the athlete wants more money to appear at that event. 191 The players associations should institute seminars for athletes in which the athletes are educated regarding the structuring of fees charged by agents. In addition the seminars should address the multiple situations in which a conflict of interest may occur and the possible consequences for the athlete. These conflicts need to be identified so that regulations can be
VIII. Conclusion
The role of the agent was developed to protect the athletes' interest in relation to that of the owners. 193 The problem now, to some degree, has become the protection of the athletes' interests in relation to those of the agents. 194 Negotiation is the most important aspect of being an agent.
195
Therefore, athletes need to understand the ethical concerns in the negotiation process and become more involved in their business affairs and financial decisions. 196 With specific uniform regulations put in place by players associations, and with more rigorous investigation and enforcement regarding these regulations, the agent will negotiate ethically and with singular loyalty to his client in an effort to ensure the optimum outcome for the athlete.
